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ABSTRACT 
Experimental analyses have identified significant tendencies for individuals to follow herd decisions, a 
finding which has been explained using Bayesian principles. This paper outlines the results from a 
herding task designed to extend these analyses using evidence from a functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) study. Empirically, we estimate logistic functions using panel estimation techniques to 
quantify the impact of herd decisions on individuals' financial decisions. We confirm that there are 
statistically significant propensities to herd and that social information about others' decisions has an 
impact on individuals' decisions. We extend these findings by identifying associations between herding 
propensities and individual characteristics including gender, age and various personality traits. In 
addition fMRI evidence shows that individual differences correlate strongly with activations in the 
amygdala – an area of the brain commonly associated with social decision-making. Individual 
differences also correlate strongly with amygdala activations during herding decisions. These findings 
are used to construct a two stage least squares model of financial herding which confirms that 
individual differences and neural responses play a role in modulating the propensity to herd. 
Keywords: herding; social influence; individual differences; neuroeconomics; fMRI; amygdala 
JEL codes: D03, D53, D70, D83, D87, G11 
1. Introduction 
Herding occurs when individuals‘ private information is overwhelmed by the influence of 
public information about the decisions of a herd or group. Evidence of group influence in 
many economic and financial decisions is consistent with bounded rationality: in an uncertain 
world, if we realise that our own judgement is fallible then it may be rational to assume that 
others are better informed and follow them (Keynes 1930,1936, 1937). Many microeconomic 
models of herding assume that social information about others‘ decisions is used in a process 
of statistical inference e.g. in a Bayesian reasoning process in which individuals adjust their a 
posteriori probabilities as new social information arrives. If decision-making is Bayesian and 
probabilistic judgements are being updated systematically and logically then rational 
updating of probabilities will propel information about others‘ choices through a group, 
generating herding and ‗informational cascades‘ via social learning.  
In a world of uncertainty, rationality may be bounded by cognitive and informational 
constraints and this may limit the use of Bayesian algorithms to guide decision-making. 
Nonetheless, an approximation of Bayesian social learning may still emerge as the outcome 
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of procedurally rational decision-making devices such as heuristics and rules of thumb. 
Herding may be a quick decision-making tool via which people copy and imitate the actions 
of others because they make a qualitative judgement that others know more about the 
fundamental long-term values of goods and assets. Also, agreeing with a group may bestow a 
utility that is independent of the information implicit in others‘ decisions. Socio-
psychological factors may also be important if normative influences such as social pressure 
encourage individuals to follow the decisions of others even in the face of contradictory 
objective information and individual differences in gender, age and personality may moderate 
this susceptibility to social influence. The importance of personality traits is consistent with 
other economic analyses focussing on the role of emotions and affect in economic and 
financial decision-making (e.g. Elster 1996, 1998; Kamstra et al. 2003; Cohen 2005; Lo et al. 
2005; Shiv et al. 2005; DellaVigna 2009; Baddeley 2010).  
In this paper, we present experimental evidence confirming that there are significant 
propensities to herd when people make financial choices. When deciding whether or not to 
buy a stock, this sample of experimental subjects were significantly more likely to agree with 
a herd than not. Panel fixed effects estimation shows that there is significant heterogeneity in 
individual propensities to herd within this sample. Further estimations establish that this 
heterogeneity can be captured by individual differences, including gender, age and a range of 
personality traits, in particular some of those usually associated with sociability.  Then 
functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) evidence shows that herding decisions are strongly 
correlated with amygdala activations. These amygdala activations are in turn strongly 
correlated with almost all the individual differences that correlate with propensity to herd. 
Previous studies have shown that the amygdala is implicated in social decision-making and 
social learning. Overall our evidence confirms these previous studies and suggests that 
herding is a process of social learning and the extent of social learning varies across 
individuals according to their particular characteristics.  
2.  Theoretical Background: Theories of Herding and Group Influence 
Herding occurs when individuals mimic others, ignoring their own substantive private 
information (Scharfstein and Stein 1990). There are many explanations for this impact of 
group influence on individuals‘ decisions including rational learning explanations based 
around Bayesian updating assumptions, and explanations based on individual 
differences, drawing particularly on insights from sociology and psychology. The approaches 
can be unified to an extent by assuming bounded rationality: in a world of uncertainty, 
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cognitive and informational constraints mean that it is difficult quantitatively to identify a 
―correct‖ course of action and so, as Simon (1979) observes, people will be procedurally 
rational – decision-making will be based on ―appropriate deliberation‖ and so, ultimately, 
will be the product of a subjective judgement. In this case, social learning still occurs as 
people adopt herding as a heuristic – a decision-making short-cut. If preferences are 
lexicographic rather than compensative then the decision to follow the group will not be the 
outcome of a compensative, updating process – as is seen in Bayesian models - but rather 
social information about what the group is doing will substitute completely for private 
information and private information will be ignored. Psychological factors will be important 
if an individual‘s propensity to use heuristics and rules of thumb is determined by their 
personal characteristics and personality traits.  
2.1 Rational Learning and Informational Cascades 
The most prominent microeconomic models of herding describe it as a rational learning 
process in which different people‘s decisions are interdependent and reinforcing. Individuals 
may rationally judge that others‘ actions contain useful information (Keynes 1930, 1936, 
1937) and, in a world of uncertainty, rational inferences can be made using Bayes‘s rule 
(Salop 1987): Bayesian updating of a priori probabilities will draw upon an extensive set of 
information - including social information about the observed actions of others.   
A key problem with Bayesian herding is that useful private information is discounted 
in favour of information about the actions of the herd (Scharfstein and Stein 1990). To 
illustrate the principles: Banerjee (1992) develops a herding model in which people look at 
what others are doing, e.g. when making fertility choices, in voting, and in financial decision-
making. Herding will be the outcome of a rational but potentially misguided information 
gathering process.  Banerjee gives the example of restaurant choice adapted here to the 
financial choices analysed in the empirical section. Let us assume that individuals have the 
option to buy a particular asset, e.g. a stock, and the ―buy‖ versus ―reject‖ decisions are 
favoured a priori 51% and 49% respectively. A group of 100 people are making sequential 
decisions about whether or not to buy the stock. If 99 out of 100 people have private signals 
(such as advice from an investment advisor) indicating that the stock price is likely to fall 
then, assuming complete access to all private signals, on the basis of the aggregate evidence it 
could be inferred that a given individual should reject the stock. Assume however that Person 
1 is the 100
th
 person with a misleading private signal (favouring a ―buy‖ decision) but is the 
first to decide. Then the group as a whole may buy the stock on the basis of the misleading 
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financial advice upon which the first person based their decision. The sequence of events that 
generates this outcome is as follows. Person 1 buys the stock on the basis of their 
(misleading) private signal. Person 2 is the next to choose. She knows the a priori probability 
(favouring a buy decision), has a correct private signal favouring a reject decision and has 
public, social information about the prior actions of Person 1. Applying Bayes‘s rule and 
assuming that she weights these last two pieces of information equally, the information about 
Person 1‘s choice will cancel out Person 2‘s own private signal. So Person 2 will rationally 
choose to buy the stock on the basis of prior probabilities (marginally favouring a buy 
decision). Similarly Person 3 will decide to buy on the basis of Person 1 and 2‘s choices and 
so on – the impact of the incorrect signal will cascade through the herd and the herd will 
move towards a buy decision even though 99% of private signals favour a reject decision. 
Equally, the herd would have headed in the right direction if another person had been first to 
choose but nonetheless Banerjee emphasises that the herd may generate a negative ‗herding 
externality‘ if important, relevant private information is ignored in the aggregate.  The 
informational value of 99 pieces of correct private information recommending that the share 
should be rejected may be lost and, even though behaviour is Bayes rational, the impact of 
relevant private information will be limited. 
Bikhanchandi, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992, 1998) develop a similar model of 
sequential decision-making in which informational cascades explain localised conformity 
which emerges when it is optimal for an individual to follow the actions of his/her 
predecessor and to disregard his private information. Just as is seen in Banerjee‘s model each 
sequential decision conveys no real new evidence to subsequent members of the herd. In both 
models, herding is described as a boundedly rational response to imperfect information and 
will generate convergence onto an outcome determined by social information about herd 
actions rather than private information.  Private information becomes inefficiently 
uninformative, sometimes leading to convergence of behaviour onto stable outcomes but 
often leading to convergence onto idiosyncratic and fragile outcomes (Chamley 2003).
3
 
A large number of economic experiments have been conducted to test Bayesian 
theories of rational herding, starting with Anderson and Holt (1996, 1997). Many of these 
experiments verify Bayesian hypotheses.  Others have extended this experimental evidence to 
distinguish between herding as a broad descriptive category of copying behaviours and 
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informational cascades as a specific form of learning that arises in uncertain situations (e.g. 
see Sgroi 2003, Çelen and Kariv 2004, Alevy et al. 2007).  
The systematic patterns in herding identified in the experimental literature can be 
reconciled with a range of hypotheses about rationality. Following Avery and Zemsky 
(1998), Park and Sgroi (2009) allow rational herding and rational contrarianism (behaviour 
contrary to herd choices) in a herding experiment that allows multiple states and multiple 
signals. They observe both rational and irrational contrarianism but generally 70% of their 
experimental subjects‘ behaviour is consistent with their benchmark for rationality. When 
they correct for those who don‘t trade (i.e. the irrational non-traders) behaviour becomes 
predictable. They conclude that policy makers should be careful not to categorise all herding 
as irrational: with rational herding, improved information and clearer signals would lead to a 
decrease in herding. Cipriani and Guarino (2005) adapt Bayesian models to incorporate 
flexible prices in a model in which cascades cannot occur. They find that some subjects do 
not use their private information, choosing either not to trade or to ignore private information 
by engaging in contrarian trading. Ivanov et al. (2009) also assess Bayesian modes of 
thinking and find that experimental subjects are not necessarily using probabilistic thinking 
and may be using boundedly rational, insight-based rules of thumb, instead of belief-based 
reasoning.  
2.2 The role of individual difference 
Bayesian theories of rational updating of probabilistic judgements using social information 
describe individual decision-making emerging from the application of a mechanical 
algorithm in which information about group decisions is used to update individuals‘ 
probabilistic judgements, thus generating informational cascades. Çelen and Kariv (2004) 
distinguish between the precise phenomenon of informational cascades, which is sequential 
herding generated by Bayesian reasoning, and the more general phenomenon of herding just 
as following a group. There is general evidence that decision-making is not the outcome of 
statistical inference alone; furthermore, people are not necessarily competent in applying 
principles of statistical inference in practice (Salop 1987; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; 
Baddeley et al. 2005). For example, cognitive biases may limit rational behaviour in ‗reverse 
cascades‘ –when incorrect decisions lead to information cascades down the wrong path 
(Sgroi 2003).  Also, if herding is a time-saving decision-making heuristic, then certain 
personality types will be more likely to use a herding heuristic as a decision-making shortcut. 
This would be consistent with Herbert Simon‘s (1979) concept of procedural rationality, i.e. 
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behaviour is adapted to specific circumstances and will involve the application of common-
sense rather than mathematical or statistical algorithms / rules (Baddeley 2006). 
There is substantial evidence that economic and financial decisions are affected by 
individual differences and psychological factors; personality traits will affect decision-
making if they generate particular emotional predispositions (Elster 1996, 1998; Baddeley 
2010). Kamstra et al. (2003) and Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) analyse the impact of 
weather-related mood changes on financial markets to show that fluctuations in emotions and 
mood affect financial and economic decisions. Lo, Repin and Steenbarger (2005) identified 
roles for personality traits and fear/greed in the behaviour of day traders. Shiv, Loewenstein, 
Bechara, Damasio and Damasio (2005), using lesion patient studies, identify a relationship 
between impaired emotional response and risk-taking behaviour. Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) 
identify deviations from rational behaviour in financial decision-making and use functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) evidence to identify a role for emotion and affect. These 
analyses, and others, suggest that emotions and moods have significant impacts on economic 
/ financial decisions and there may be similar interactions between tendencies to herd and 
specific psychological characteristics.  
Evolutionary principles will also play a role. Herding instincts are widely observed 
throughout the animal kingdom, in species as diverse as honey bees, ants, antelope, sheep and 
cows and whilst such instincts may have impulsive aspects, evolutionary pressure may have 
led to the evolution of these instincts to enable social learning: animals better able to monitor 
the actions of others will acquire social information about resource availability and mating 
potential and these animals will be more likely to reproduce (Danchin et al. 2004). In a 
similar way, socially influenced herding instincts may have evolved as a learning heuristic 
enabling us easily to acquire important social information about the potential value of our 
acquisitions. Evolutionary forces may also encourage us to follow a group because there is 
safety in numbers. 
Social forces will also play a role and herding may be partly explained via principles 
of social psychology, particularly sociological analyses of crowd influence and group 
pressure e.g. as developed from le Bon‘s (1896) analysis of mob psychology. Sociological 
studies emphasise the importance of situational factors including normative influences from 
wanting to conform versus informational influences emerging with learning from others‘ 
actions. This distinction between normative and informational influences is a distinction that 
also surfaces in the economic literature on conformity (e.g. see Bernheim 1994; Becker and 
Murphy 2000). Bayesian learning theories cannot account fully for the impact of normative 
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influence, in part reflecting difficulties of effectively modelling and quantifying social factors 
(though these difficulties can be partly overcome by embedding social factors such as status 
and reputation into individuals‘ preferences, see Bernheim 1994; Scharfstein and Stein 1990). 
However, the emphasis in sociology on informational influence parallels more closely social 
learning models in economics. For example, Asch (1951, 1955) presented evidence from 
controlled experiments which showed that, when asked to make simple judgements about the 
lengths of lines, a substantial minority of experimental subjects were susceptible to intra-
group pressure and were persuaded to change their minds in the face of deliberately 
misleading decisions from experimental confederates, with effects increasing as group size 
and consensus increased.
4
 Wrong choices in Asch-style tasks may reflect social learning if 
they are the result of the subjects‘ perceptions of their own visual limitations rather than an 
attempt to avoid conflict: for example, Shiller (1995) argues that Asch‘s findings are not 
inconsistent with a rational learning process because experimental subjects tend to attribute 
their mistakes to their own physical limitations, such as poor eyesight. There is also evidence 
that people will follow decisions of a group of computers in much the same way that they 
will follow a human herd‘s decision suggesting that following the crowd is not just about 
peer pressure; social influence even without human face-to-face interactions is consistent 
with social learning from a group‘s decisions (Deutsch and Gerard 1955; Bikhchandani et al. 
1992). 
In a world of bounded rationality, these different approaches from economics, 
psychology, sociology and evolutionary biology can be reconciled as different ways of 
explaining social learning. Herding behaviour may be the outcome of interplays between 
rational/cognitive and instinctive/emotional processes as well as a reflection of economic, 
sociological and psychological impacts emerging in different situations and individual 
predispositions (Baddeley 2010). Neuroeconomics can also offer useful lessons because 
when people are influenced by social information then this may reflect an interaction between 
a deliberative learning process and a more instinctive, affective, emotional responses – and 
these interactions can be quantified using neuroimaging techniques.  
3. Experimental Hypotheses 
In testing the range of issues explored above, we develop the following hypotheses:  
3.1 In uncertain situations, people tend to follow others. 
In the empirical analysis, following Çelen and Kariv‘s (2004) distinction between sequential 
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decision-making generating informational cascades and the broader phenomenon of herding 
as the tendency to agree with group decisions, we adopt the latter more general definition. As 
explored above, the tendency to follow others may reflect a range of factors. Primarily it may 
be the outcome of social learning. In some situations, this may reflect Bayesian updating but 
in a world of bounded rationality when informational and cognitive constraints limit Bayesian 
reasoning, herding may be the outcome of a quick and simple rule of thumb i.e. the heuristic 
of following others reflects a judgement that others may know more and so their actions 
signal the best strategy. This latter explanation is also consistent with herding hypotheses 
seen in sociology and evolutionary biology. A further reason for people to herd comes from 
economics and/or sociology: doing what others do may increase an individual‘s utility; peer 
pressure may encourage people to do what others are doing. 
3.2 Propensities to herd will vary across people and will be affected by individual 
differences in gender, age and personality. 
If herding reflects individual differences then individual characteristics and heterogeneity 
amongst people will have a significant and systematic impact. More sociable individuals will 
be more responsive to social influence, they will be more likely to herd and so personality 
traits including empathy, socialisation and extraversion will correlate positively with the 
propensity to herd. In a world of bounded rationality, herding may be a quick decision-
making heuristic in which case herding is more likely to be seen in impulsive and 
venturesome individuals. In addition, gender and age are included in the econometric analysis 
on the basis of evidence that conformity is an (inverse) function of age (Walker and Andrade 
1996) and is more prevalent amongst women (Milgram 1963).  
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3.3 Decisions to herd will correlate with amygdala activation 
Neuroeconomic studies show that decision-making may reflect an interaction of deliberative 
and affective factors. The amygdala is implicated in processing social and emotional salience 
(Todd and Anderson 2009). In the context of social situations, the amygdala plays a role in 
social decision-making, e.g. in social judgements (Adolphs et al. 1998) and in observational / 
social learning and memory conformity (Burke et al. 2010b, Davis et al. 2009, Edelson et al. 
2011). Also, amygdala volume correlates with social network size (Bickart et al. 2011), it is 
implicated in social learning specifically when processing fearful faces in dangerous 
situations (Whalen et al. 1998) and it is differentially activated in regulating social distance 
(Kennedy et al. 2009). On the basis of these studies, we hypothesis that the amygdala is also 
activated when doing what others do, perhaps reflecting the influence of social learning. 
4. Experimental Design 
4.1 Experimental Context 
Following Pillas (2006) and Baddeley et al. (2007) the stock-picking task used here was 
designed (using COGENT graphics and MATLAB7) as a computer simulated task for fMRI 
analysis (see also Burke et al. 2010a). Whilst the context of the experiment is therefore 
relatively artificial the use of a computer-based design was justified on the basis of evidence 
that experimental subjects are affected in similar ways by the actions of virtual and real 
experimental confederates (Reysen 2005). The presentation of the information adopts a 
similar task design to that used by Berns, Chappelow, Zink, Pagnoni, Martin-Skurski and 
Richards (2005) in their exploration of the impact of social conformity in mental rotation 
tasks; in particular our design adopts their approach to task sequencing and the presentation 
of social information.  
4.2 Task Structure  
The experiments analysed here capture the propensity to herd in a stock-picking task for 
which each experimental subject has to decide whether or not to buy a particular stock. In 
making their decisions, experimental subjects were given two sources of information 
sequentially. First they were given private information in the form of a chart of past stock 
prices. Then they were given social information about the decisions of a group of four (the 
―herd‖).  
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Each trial of the task consisted of the following stages: 
Stage 1: Subjects were given their own ―private‖ information about the past performance of 
the stock in the form of an artificially generated time series of daily stock returns over a year. 
These charts were presented to all subjects in four combinations of high /low mean and 
high/low variance stocks. In addition, charts of scrambled stock images were used as 
controls. See Fig 1a. 
 
Stage 2: Subjects were then presented with social information about the herd choices – with 
the ―herd‖ represented as 4 faces.5 The choices of the group/herd were represented on the 
computer screen with a tick mark (‗buy‘) or a cross (‗reject‘) above each face photo. There 
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Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium. 
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were four types of herd decision: +4 (all decided to buy), 2-2 (half of the herd buys, the other 
half rejects), -4 (all reject), and a control scenario in which no group decision was conveyed. 
See Fig 1b. The experimental subjects were told that the people represented by these faces 
had been involved in a pilot experiment and that their choices were real, informed choices 
based on the same information shown to the experimental subjects.
6
 
For Stages 1 and 2, the images of private and social information were shown for 1.5 seconds 
for each image, considerably longer than the average reaction time (0.4s) of human traders 
(Broyon and Duka, 2006). 
Stage 3: After seeing the social information about the herd‘s choice, subjects were then asked 
to decide whether or not to buy the stock by pressing one of two buttons on a button-box.  
To summarise, in total there were 20 task scenarios (5 private information scenarios x 4 
social information scenarios) as shown in the following matrix: 
SCENARIO MATRIX 
Private information: Stock Image   Social information: Herd choices 
i. High mean, high variance (HMHV)  i. Herd buys (+4) 
ii. High mean, low variance (HMLV)  ii. Herd split (2-2) 
iii. Low mean, high variance (LMHV)  iii. Herd rejects (-4) 
iv. Low mean, low variance (LMLV)  iv. No herd signal (NS) 
v. Scrambled image (SCRAMBLE) 
 +4 2-2 -4 NS 
HMHV 1 2 3 4 
HMLV 5 6 7 8 
LMHV 9 10 11 12 
LMLV 13 14 15 16 
SCRAMBLE 17 18 19 20 
There were 12 repetitions for each of the 20 task scenarios. This analysis focuses specifically 
on the social information scenarios in which the herd decision was unambiguous i.e. Herd 
buys (+4) and Herd rejects (-4) over all the private information scenarios. So overall 12 
repetitions of 10 of the above scenarios were used for each subject in this analysis. To 
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 A separate herding control condition was used in which the task was run with a herd represented by 4 
chimpanzee faces. The responses to chimp choices are not used in this paper because they are not relevant to the 
issues explored here but an analysis of the chimp scenarios can be found in Burke et al. (2010a).  
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prevent learning and superstitious effects, no feedback was given whilst the subjects were 
performing the task.  
4.3 Experimental subjects and participant incentives 
The 17 right-handed healthy subjects (11 females and 6 males) were recruited via 
advertisements on the University of Cambridge campus and on a local community website. 
The mean age of participants was 24.3 years and all were native English speakers. All 
participants gave informed consent, and the Local Research Ethics Committee of the 
Cambridgeshire Health Authority approved the study.  
 The experimental incentives were designed following behavioural piloting to ensure 
that the participants did not mindlessly buy every stock offered to them. To avoid the 
interpretative complications of non-linearity in value functions, as highlighted both in 
critiques of subjective utility theory and in developments of cumulative prospect theory, the 
task and its context was simplified in a number of ways. Participants were paid a ―show-up‖ 
fee of £20 and instructed that they could buy each stock at the mean price of its particular 
distribution and would be rewarded if they bought high performing stocks. To prevent loss 
aversion biases, the participants were told that they could not lose more than their initial 
show-up fee. Participants earned £32.50 on average (including the initial £20).  
 Before the official experimental trials, the design and purpose of the experiment was 
made clear by issuing the experimental subjects with detailed instructions in the form of a 
powerpoint slide presentation (see Appendix 1) as well as giving them prior training in the 
execution of the task. To minimise error trials during scanning, participants learned the 
timings and sequencing of task events for 20 training trials no more than 7 days prior to 
scanning.     
4.4 Measuring individual differences 
After the task had been completed, the experimental subjects completed a range of 
personality and other questionnaires as well as post-scanning interviews to test the hypothesis 
that individual characteristics, including psychological traits, will predispose individuals to a 
herding response. A range of psychological traits were measured using published 
psychometric tests. Impulsivity, venturesomeness and empathy were measured using 
Eysenck‘s Impulsivity, Venturesomeness and Empathy (IVE) questionnaire (Eysenck and 
Eysenck 1978). Extraversion and Psychoticism were measured using Eysenck‘s Personality 
Revised Questionnaire – EPQR (Eysenck and Eysenck 1975, 1976; Eysenck, Eysenck and 
Barrett 1985).  
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4.5 Econometric analysis  
 Below we assess the impact of the economic, sociological and psychological factors outlined 
above using econometric techniques to test the experimental hypotheses introduced in section 
3. As explained above, the experimental subjects were making binary choices about: firstly –
whether or not to buy a particular stock; and secondly –whether or not to buy a stock 
conditioned upon the social information provided about a herd‘s decision. Denoting H=1 as a 
decision that coincides with the herd‘s decision and Ω as the information set, including both 
private and social information, the probability of herding is given by: 
herdpHHE )|1Pr()|( . 
Following Brock and Durlauf (2000), behaviour is modelled as a discrete choice and 
estimated using binary dependent variable estimation techniques viz. logit using the logistic 
function
7
:  
)exp(1
)exp(
)(
x
x
xGpherd   (1) 
where x   is a matrix of explanatory variables and accompanying parameters. 
Panel fixed effect (FE) estimation was used to capture the fact that the preferences of 
individual experimental subjects may vary and to overcome problems of endogeneity created 
by heterogeneity bias in a panel estimation context. FE estimation was used in preference to 
random effects because FE generates concrete parameter estimates for subject-specific 
differences and the heterogeneity in the econometric models is not purely the outcome of 
randomness; also, FE is informative when panel estimation is applied to data that do not 
involve time (Wooldridge 2003, p. 473-4). 
 We use z tests to test the individual significance of each explanatory variable ( 0:0 kH ) 
and we use a likelihood ratio test to test the overall explanatory power ( 0||:0 kH ). 
Estimations were conducted using the statistical package STATA 11 MP. 
4.6 fMRI methods 
Standard rapid event-related fMRI methods were used to capture neural activity.  These 
methods are based upon the fact that, as activity increases in a specific neural area, more 
oxygen is needed and so the ratio of oxyhemoglobin to deoxyhemoglobin increases. These 
hemodynamic responses were measured using blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) 
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 In capturing preferences to buy and/or to herd, logit was selected over probit because we could not assume that 
the distribution of choices would follow a standard normal distribution. 
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signals. Specifically, the BOLD signal contrast was captured for decisions to agree versus 
disagree with the herd. These data were analysed using Statistical Parametric Mapping 
(SPM5; Functional Imaging Lab, UCL). 
5. Results and Interpretation 
Our statistical / econometric analysis is designed to discover first –whether social information 
about the choices of a herd or group of people changes the probability that our experimental 
subjects will buy a particular stock, and second– in decisions to go with the herd, which 
individual differences increase the probability that a person will follow the herd, and thirdly – 
whether differential amygdala activations correlate with decisions to follow a group. The 
econometric analysis assesses these questions in turn. The first set of estimations corroborates 
existing economic experimental evidence (cited earlier) about tendencies to herd. The 
probabilities of buying a stock are significantly higher when the subjects are told that the herd 
has bought the stock. The second set of estimations focuses on capturing the decision to 
follow the herd in terms of individual differences.  
Table 1 shows the conditional probabilities of buying and herding in the various 
experimental scenarios.   
TABLE 1 - CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES OF BUY AND HERD DECISIONS 
    
             Pr(Buy)  Pr(Agree with herd)  
n=2040 
 
All scenarios     52.0%  77.4% 
Private information scenarios for share price changes:  
 
   High mean   56.3%  76.1% 
   Low variance   58.1%  77.2% 
   Scrambled   37.5%  80.1% 
Social information scenarios:    
 
   Herd buys (+4)  79.4%  79.4% 
   Herd rejects (-4)  24.5%  75.4% 
 
  
  
15 
 
Assuming no social or private information is available, the baseline probability that a 
person will buy a stock is 50.0)1Pr( buypBuy . There is no a priori reason to expect the 
person to favour a buy versus reject decision because there were equal numbers of low/high 
mean and high / low variance stocks. The results in Table 1 confirm that the unconditional 
buyp  for subjects in our sample is 0.52. Experimental subjects were more likely to buy stocks 
with a high mean and/or a low variance and this is consistent with the behaviour predicted by 
mean-variance analysis. 
As explained in section 2, the concept of herding implies that the agreement between 
the herd and the experimental subject is not a coincidence. We hypothesise that if people are 
being persuaded by a herd‘s decisions then this will lead to a significant increase in buyp  if 
the herd buys; if the herd rejects a stock then this leads to a significant decrease in
 buy
p . For 
the scenarios in which the herd made a clear choice to either buy or reject (i.e. the +4 and –4 
scenarios), there are 4 possible combinations of subject and herd decisions, as follows: 
  Herd’s choice 
 
  Buy Reject 
Experimental 
subject’s choice   
Buy Buy, Buy Buy, Reject 
Reject Reject, Buy Reject, Reject 
 These four scenarios are mutually exclusive and exhaustive so the unconditional a 
priori likelihood that a subject will coincidentally agree with the herd decision is 50%, i.e.  
50.0)1Pr( agreepAgree . We hypothesise that the probability of herding is higher than 
the unconditional probability of coincident subject and herd decisions, i.e. agreeherd pp   
where 5.0agreep . The experimental data show a herding probability of 77.2%, which is 
statistically significantly larger than 0.50.
8
 This is consistent with the hypotheses that herding 
is a form of social learning and/or that Bayesian reasoning is involved when social 
information is presented to experimental subjects. 
5.1 Capturing revealed preferences: when do subjects buy? 
For the first set of econometric estimations, logistic functions for a ―buy‖ decision were 
estimated conditioned on revealed preferences for the 4 combinations of high /low 
                                                 
8 ]000.0[,57.24
2040
50.050.0
500.0772.0
,50.0:,50.0: 10 pzpHpH herdherd   
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mean/variance stocks, whether herd decided to buy, and subject-specific fixed effects using a 
different dummy variable for each experimental subject. These dummies were included to 
capture individual differences in propensities to buy. Thus, for a given individual i, the 
probability of a ―buy‖ decision is given by: 
),(, ipibuy afp   (2) 
 
Where 
p
 is the private and social information made available to each experimental subject, 
as described above, and ai is the subject specific fixed effect, capturing the differences across 
the experimental subjects in the predicted probabilities of a buy decision.  
 
TABLE 2 - LOGISTIC ESTIMATION OF BUY DECISION 
Panel fixed effects estimation 
 
Dependent variable: SBUY(=1 if buys, =0 if rejects) 
n = 2040 
  Odds   z score   p value 
    ratio      
Herd buys 14.740  23.190  0.000*** 
High mean 1.411  3.020  0.003*** 
Low variance 1.768  4.960  0.000*** 
Subject-specific fixed effects: 
S2  1.108  0.320  0.749 
S3  0.400  -2.860  0.004*** 
S4  0.571  -1.750  0.080* 
S5  1.227  0.640  0.523 
S6  0.280  -3.950  0.000*** 
S7  2.302  2.560  0.010*** 
S8  0.601  -1.590  0.111 
S9  0.326  -3.480  0.000*** 
S10  0.633  -1.430  0.152 
S11  0.601  -1.590  0.111 
S12  1.859  1.920  0.055* 
S13  0.491  -2.230  0.026** 
S14  0.737  -0.960  0.339 
S15  0.858  -0.480  0.632 
S16  0.633  -1.430  0.152 
S17  0.601  -1.590  0.111 
Likelihood Ratio test: 
2
(19) = 786.06 [p=0.000] 
Log likelihood = -1019.4208                           
 
* Estimate significantly different from zero at 10% significance.  
** Significantly different at 5%,  
*** Significantly different at 1%. 
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The results reported in Table 2 confirm information from conditional probabilities above and 
the statistically significant [p<0.01] z scores on ―high mean‖ and ―low variance‖ show 
respectively that the experimental subjects are significantly more likely to choose high mean 
and/or low variance stocks. This suggests that, after controlling for the impact of the social 
information, the experimental subjects are choosing as predicted by mean-variance analysis, 
confirming the results from Table 1. In addition, the z scores on the subject specific fixed 
effects included to capture individual differences are significantly different from zero 
[p<0.10] for 7 of the experimental subjects indicating that there is considerable heterogeneity 
of preferences across the sample of experimental subjects. This is preliminary evidence that 
individual differences are important. The impact of the social information is also shown in 
Table 2. Confirming the conditional probabilities from Table 1, the z scores on ―Herd Buys‖ 
shows that there is a statistically significant [p=0.000] increase in the tendency to buy when 
the herd buys; the odds ratio shows that the subjects are more than 14 times more likely to 
buy a stock when the herd buys relative to when the herd rejects. This result confirms 
evidence from previous studies showing that social information about others‘ choices 
changes people‘s decisions.  
5.2 Why do subjects follow the herd? 
To further analyse the propensity to herd conditioned on subject specific differences we next 
estimate the probability that a subject will agree with the herd.
9
 We analyse econometrically 
the hypotheses about herding as outlined in section 3, i.e. that herding is the product of 
individual differences and non-economic factors such as personality traits, gender and age. 
Also, these factors might predispose experimental subjects to particular emotional responses 
that would encourage herd-copying behaviour and the impact of emotional factors is explored 
using neuroimaging evidence.  
As explained above, herding implies a non-random choice to copy what the herd is doing 
and so must necessarily capture something other than the probability of coincidentally 
agreeing with the herd. In estimating herding propensities, as for the previous estimations, we 
initially include fixed effects to capture individual differences – ia  but further estimations 
were also run in which herding probabilities were conditioned on the specific measures of 
                                                 
9
 Additional estimations showed that there was no statistically significant association between probability of 
buying and probability of herding. 
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individual differences.
10
 The herding probabilities were estimated assuming that a 
combination of factors determines an individual‘s propensity to herd by adapting equation (1) 
as follows: 
)exp(1
)exp(
),(|Pr(
x
x
Hp hpherd   (3) 
where x —the vector of explanatory variables, includes either ai (subject specific fixed 
effects) or individual differences measured using information about gender, age and 
personality traits.  
The results from FE estimation to capture heterogeneity across the subjects are 
outlined in Table 3. These results show that private information about the type of stock (i.e. 
its mean and variance) is not significantly associated with propensities to herd. For 9 of the 
subjects the fixed effects capturing individual heterogeneity are strongly statistically 
significant [p<0.01] suggesting that there is a significant amount of heterogeneity across the 
subjects in terms of their propensity to herd.  
TABLE 3 - LOGISTIC ESTIMATION: AGREEING WITH THE HERD 
Panel fixed effects estimation 
Dependent variable: AGREE (=1 if agree with herd to buy or reject, otherwise =0 ) 
n = 1920
11
 
 Odds ratio  z score  p value  
High mean 0.864 -1.230 0.218 
Low variance 1.002 0.020 0.984 
S2 2.379 3.020 0.003*** 
S3 1.330 1.070 0.286 
S4 40.801 5.030 0.000*** 
S5 2.379 3.020 0.003*** 
S6 1.549 1.610 0.107 
S7 0.815 -0.780 0.434 
S8 0.872 -0.520 0.601 
S9 0.934 -0.260 0.793 
S10 20.053 5.540 0.000*** 
S11 11.161 5.590 0.000*** 
S12 2.167 2.730 0.006*** 
S13 2.625 3.310 0.001*** 
S14 15.904 5.610 0.000*** 
S15 1.035 0.130 0.895 
S17 82.298 4.320 0.000*** 
Likelihood Ratio test: 
2
(17) = 324.7 [p=0.000] 
Log likelihood = -895.952            
*** Significant at 1%. 
                                                 
10
 The fixed effects cannot be included alongside these other measures of individual differences because this 
would create a problem of perfect multicollinearity between the fixed effects and the matrix of subject-specific 
characteristics. 
11
 Subject 16 was excluded because of perfect multicollinearity; this subject always followed the herd. 
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In unravelling the sources of heterogeneity in different subjects‘ propensity to herd, 
explanatory variables were included to identify the impact of specific individual differences 
including age, gender and personality traits (as outlined in section 4.4). The private 
information variables to capture the impact of mean and variance were retained. 
 
TABLE 4 - LOGISTIC ESTIMATION: AGREEING WITH THE HERD 
Impact of individual differences 
 
Dependent variable: AGREE (=1 if agree with herd to buy or reject, otherwise =0) 
n=2040 
 Odds  z score p value 
 ratio  
High mean 0.874  -1.180  0.237 
Low variance 1.002  0.020  0.985 
Gender (M=1, F=0) 0.453  -3.860  0.000*** 
Age 0.948  -2.500  0.012** 
Impulsivity 1.189  7.790  0.000*** 
Venturesomeness 1.251  9.670  0.000*** 
Empathy 1.047  2.150  0.032** 
Sensitivity to reward 0.939  -3.100  0.002*** 
Sensitivity to punishment 0.831  -8.420  0.000*** 
Psychoticism (vs socialised) 0.821  -3.810  0.000*** 
Extraversion 0.745  -9.330  0.000*** 
Likelihood Ratio test: 
2
(11) = 166.98 [p=0.000] 
Log likelihood = -1006.6334 
** Significantly different from zero at 5% 
*** Significantly different at 1%. 
 
The estimations set out in Table 4 confirm the findings from FE estimation i.e. that 
private information about the mean and variance of a stock is not significantly associated 
with propensities to herd. On the other hand, individual differences are strongly significant. 
Male subjects were significantly less likely to herd [p=0.000]. Also, the older subjects were 
significantly less likely to herd across all scenarios 9 [p=0.012], confirming other research 
suggesting that older people are less susceptible to social pressure (Walker and Andrade 
1996).   
Empathetic individuals are more likely to herd and the effect is significant at a 5% 
significance level [p=0.032]. Individuals with higher scores on the psychoticism scale (i.e. 
the less socialised individuals) are less likely to herd and again the impact is strongly 
significant [p=0.000]. Empathy and psychoticism are, respectively, positively and negatively 
associated with sociability and so the impacts of these traits confirm the hypotheses outlined 
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in section 3.2, viz. that herding is more likely amongst more sociable individuals and suggest 
that social awareness may increase a person‘s tendency to herd. Another facet of a sociable 
nature – extraversion, is highly significant but with a negative parameter suggesting that 
extraverts are less likely to herd [p=0.000]. This may reflect the fact that extraversion may be 
correlated with other personality traits which decrease herding tendencies e.g. it may link 
with confidence and confident individuals may be less willing to change their minds in 
response to social influence. Alternatively, extraversion corresponds at least partly to 
sensitivity to reward, which in turn correlates negatively with the propensity to herd (as 
explained below). 
Other groups of personality traits also have a strong impact. Sensitivity to punishment and 
sensitivity to reward are both highly significant [p=0.000] and [p=0.002] respectively, and 
negatively correlated with herding. Traits associated with quick thought have an impact and 
herding tendencies are positively and significantly associated with venturesomeness 
[p=0.000] and impulsivity [p=0.000]. An explanation consistent with boundedly rational 
decision-making is that following the herd is a heuristic used by impulsive, venturesome 
people who want to make decisions quickly.   
To establish the role of emotional processing in social learning, BOLD fMRI analysis 
(explained in section 4.4) reveals significant amygdala activation for the herd versus no herd 
contrast (left amygdala peak voxel (-24,-3,-24) z=2.162 [p=0.015], see also Fig. 2).  
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Fig. 2: Differential activation in the amygdala: herd-no herd contrast 
 
  
 
Using the data on amygdala activations, a further set of econometric estimations was 
conducted to link together herding tendencies, individual differences and emotional responses 
– with the latter focussing on amygdala activations because its role in social decision-making 
has been established in previous studies, as outlined in section 3.3. The link between herding 
and amygdala activation was estimated first using a simple logistic estimation and the results 
from the econometric estimation summarised in Table 5A confirm that there is a strongly 
significant association between differential amygdala activation and the probability of 
agreeing with the herd [p=0.000].  
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TABLE 5 - AGREEING WITH THE HERD: NEUROECONOMIC EVIDENCE 
fMRI analysis of amygdala activation 
n=1800
12
 
 
5A – Uncorrected estimation 
Dependent variable: AGREE (=1 if agree with herd to buy or reject, =0 otherwise) 
 
 Odds  z score  p value 
 ratio  
Amygdala activation  1.492  10.580  0.000*** 
Likelihood Ratio test: 
2
(1) = 123.96 [p=0.000] 
Log likelihood = -961.06 
 
5B – Two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation 
 
Least squares estimation of predicted amygdala activation 
Dependent variable: Amygdala activation when deciding whether or not to agree                        
 
 Parameter  t ratio p value 
 estimate 
Gender (M=1)  -1.180 -5.970 0.000*** 
Age  -0.095 -8.240 0.000*** 
Impulsivity  0.288 22.810 0.000*** 
Venturesomeness  0.113 3.120 0.002*** 
Empathy  0.080 3.440 0.001*** 
Sensitivity to reward  0.042 2.670 0.008*** 
Sensitivity to punishment  -0.165 -6.850 0.000*** 
Psychoticism   -0.201 -3.890 0.000*** 
Extraversion  -0.279 -8.730 0.000*** 
Neuroticism  -0.128 -5.000 0.000*** 
Lie scale  -0.125 -2.810 0.005*** 
Constant  9.885 22.710 0.000***  
R
2
 = 0.2734  R
2
 (adjusted) = 0.2690 
F test of explanatory power:  F(11,1788) = 61.18 [p=0.000]   
 
2SLS Logistic estimation using predicted amygdala activations 
Dependent variable: AGREE (=1 if agree with herd to buy or reject, =0 otherwise) 
 
 Odds  
 ratio z score p value 
Predicted amydala 1.352 4.480 0.000*** 
activation         
Likelihood Ratio test: 
2
(1) = 20.03 [p=0.000] 
Log likelihood = -1013.02 
 
 
*** Significantly different from zero at 1% 
                                                 
12
 Two subjects were excluded from the imaging results because always or almost always herded and so fMRI 
contrasts could not be calculated. 
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Next, Table 5B shows the results from the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation of 
herding and amygdala response. 2SLS was used first to correct problems of endogeneity and 
also to capture the mediating impact of individual differences. In the first stage of 2SLS, 
amygdala activation is predicted using individual differences as instruments with additional 
personality traits – neuroticism and lie scale scores – included because these may correlate 
with potential sources of endogeneity, particularly measurement error. Then the predicted 
values from the first stage were used in the final 2SLS estimations. The results from the first 
stage of 2SLS show that all the individual differences correlate significantly with amygdala 
activation (all parameters significant at p<0.01) and, with the exception of sensitivity to 
reward, in the same direction as in the estimations outlined in Table 4. In the second stage of 
the 2SLS estimations, the predicted amygdala activation variable is again strongly significant 
[p=0.000] with a similar odds ratio, indicating that the endogeneity from using uncorrected 
amygdala activations did not create a large degree of bias. Moreover, the fact that individual 
differences largely correlate with amygdala activations with the same direction and 
significance as they correlate with propensity to herd, suggests that individual differences 
may play a role in emotional processing: individual characteristics affect differential 
amygdala activations which in turn affect the propensity to herd.   
6. Implications and Conclusions 
Herding affects a wide range of human behavior, and this study has focussed specifically 
on financial herding. Understanding herding in financial markets is an important issue 
because herding has such destabilising impacts on the financial sector - particularly as 
herding, by definition, reflects a neglect of important non-social information. Financial 
instability will be exacerbated by herding tendencies and, given the dependence of real 
activity on finance, impacts will spread to investment, employment and output. Thus it is 
important to understand the phenomenon of financial herding because it raises some crucial 
policy challenges especially in the context of recent financial crises. 
The experimental results presented here indicate that subjects‘ financial choices are 
affected by herd decisions and that the propensity to herd is not homogenous but varies by 
gender/age and across personality types. In addition, the findings outlined in this paper 
suggest that herding can be explained in terms of individual differences and herding is 
associated with some of the traits specifically linked to a socialised personality. Herding is 
also positively associated with personality traits including impulsivity and venturesomeness. 
This may indicate that it is an acquired, automated decision-making heuristic that enables 
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people to decide quickly in uncertain situations. This analysis also identifies a significant 
relationship between herding and amygdala activation and this may reflect the fact that the 
amygdala plays a role in social learning and decision-making. 
Further investigations of individual differences could uncover other behavioural / 
psychological correlates of herding. Other studies suggest that intelligence is positively 
associated with empathy, extraversion and socialisation, but negatively associated with 
impulsivity (Eysenck and Eysenck 1976)
13
 and so further research could explore the impacts 
of cognitive ability, impulsivity and herding. This might also help to explain the greater 
reliance on herd information amongst more impulsive individuals.
14
 A negative correlation 
between herding and cognitive ability might also explain the negative parameters on 
extraversion identified in this study: if the essential characteristic is cognitive ability, then the 
extraversion variable could be acting as proxies for cognitive ability in this analysis.  
The evidence about the links between propensities to herd, individual differences and 
differential amygdala activation may enable the development of herding models which clarify 
the role played by emotional processing, thus reconciling theories about rational and 
emotional / affective influences on behaviour (Camerer et al. 2004, 2005). This could involve 
the development of neuroeconomic behavioural models in which dual processing and 
consilience are emphasised, drawing together inductions from different disciplines including 
economics, experimental psychology and neuroscience (Kahneman 2003, Glimcher and 
Rustichini 2004, Camerer 2007). Resolving questions about whether herding is being 
generated by cognitive and/or affective processes does require deeper delving into the 
motivators of behaviour so better to understand the neural black-box that underlies human 
decision-making. One approach could be to develop studies on non-standard discount 
functions and time inconsistency (see Frederick et al. 2002 for a survey) to explore links with 
impulsivity, cognition and discounting parameters. McClure et al. (2004) present 
neuroeconomic evidence suggesting that time inconsistency reflects the interaction of 
separate neural systems valuing immediate versus delay rewards and, given the link between 
impulsivity and herding identified in this analysis, similar neural interactions may affect 
decisions to herd.  
                                                 
13
 Though Zeidner (1995) highlights the inconsistent and contradictory evidence about the link between 
extraversion and intelligence. 
14
See also Dohmen et al (2007) on risk aversion and impatience.  
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